Turkic States: Can They Build a New Eurasian Power Bloc?

The twentieth century belonged, in many ways, to Arab oil. The twenty-first, some believe, could belong to Turkic gas. It is an ambitious comparison, but one that was difficult to ignore in Ankara last week, where leaders of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) gathered to discuss how the vast territories stretching from the Mediterranean to the Chinese frontier could be transformed into a new centre of global economic power.

The comparison also raises an uncomfortable question. Arab countries accumulated extraordinary wealth from petroleum, built gleaming cities and acquired considerable influence over international energy markets, but much of the region remained dependent on imported technology, foreign expertise, and external security guarantees. Will the Turkic states, sitting on enormous reserves of natural gas, oil, uranium, and critical minerals, use their resources to build lasting industrial and technological power, or will they follow a similar path?

This question hovered over the proceedings at Türkiye’s Presidential Complex in Ankara, where the 13th summit of the OTS took place. The summit adopted a sweeping Ankara Declaration containing 163 points, ranging from transport corridors and energy cooperation to defence technology, artificial intelligence, education, cybersecurity and a common alphabet. Its central ambition was to turn the Turkic world from a collection of geographically connected but politically separate states into a functioning economic space linking China, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Europe.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan described the Trans-Caspian East-West Middle Corridor, the transportation network running through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye, as “a strategic line that will shape the trade of tomorrow”.

The idea of organising the Turkic world along lines resembling the Arab League began gathering momentum after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, when Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan emerged as independent states. For the first time in generations, Türkiye could establish direct political and economic relationships with countries whose languages and historical traditions were closely related to its own.

Also Read | Makkah defence pact: Should India be worried?

The fragmentation of the Turkic world, however, had a much longer history. The decline of the Ottoman Empire and its final dismemberment after the First World War separated Anatolia from territories that had once formed part of a much wider network of Turkic political, commercial, and cultural relationships. Across Central Asia, the Soviet consolidation of power brought Turkic societies under Moscow’s authority, while Turkic-speaking communities farther east remained within China.

The first summit of Turkic-speaking countries was held in Ankara on October 30, 1992. Seventeen years later, the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States was formally established in 2009, becoming the Organization of Turkic States in 2021.

At the parallel session of the Turkic World Dialogue Forum, Türkiye’s communications chief Burhanettin Duran drew attention to the historical coincidence that the new gathering was taking place on the anniversary of that first summit.

“The first Summit of the Heads of State of Turkic-Speaking Countries was held here in Ankara on this very date, 30 October, in 1992,” he recalled. “And now, on this same date, we are establishing another important platform alongside our leaders’ table: a powerful platform for ideas and communication.”

The parallels with the Arab League are striking, although the circumstances of their emergence were different. Both organisations sought to institutionalise cooperation among countries connected by language, culture and historical memory. Both faced the problem of reconciling common identity with fiercely guarded national sovereignty.

But the Turkic states also possess an economic opportunity that could give their cooperation a more practical foundation.

Kazakhstan has vast petroleum, uranium, and mineral resources, while Turkmenistan possesses some of the world’s largest proven natural gas reserves. Azerbaijan has established itself as an important energy supplier to Europe, and Uzbekistan combines mineral wealth with expanding industrial ambitions. Türkiye, although dependent on imported energy, brings a diversified manufacturing base, defence technology, established commercial institutions, and access to European markets.

The five full OTS members—Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan—have a combined population exceeding 160 million. Turkmenistan participates as an observer, alongside Hungary, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and the Economic Cooperation Organization.

At the Dialogue Forum, former Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım, who chairs the OTS Council of Elders, expressed the historical ambition in a memorable phrase.

“The sun always rises in the East and only sets in the West,” he said, suggesting that the economic and technological dominance acquired by Western countries through the Renaissance and Industrial Revolution need not remain permanent. He said the West is no longer producing wealth, and it was now up to Turkic nations to take leadership in energy resources, transportation networks, manufacturing, and technological capabilities.

Railway to redraw Eurasia

For centuries, the old Silk Road connected Chinese commercial centres with Central Asia, Persia, the Indian subcontinent, and Europe. Its routes carried not only silk, spices, and precious metals, but also religions, languages, technologies, and political ideas. The modern Middle Corridor seeks to revive that geographical advantage through railways, highways, ports, pipelines, and digital infrastructure.

Formally known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, the corridor links China to Kazakhstan, crosses the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, and continues through Georgia and Türkiye towards European markets. It combines existing railway networks with maritime connections and road transport, offering an alternative to routes passing through Russia or the troubled maritime passages of West Asia.

The strategic logic has become more compelling since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. Western sanctions and geopolitical uncertainty have made businesses increasingly interested in transport networks that avoid Russian territory. The war involving Iran, instability in the Red Sea, and concerns about shipping through the Strait of Hormuz have further exposed the vulnerability of global supply chains.

For landlocked Central Asian countries, the Middle Corridor promises something they have historically lacked: more independent access to international markets. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan have long depended on routes passing through larger neighbouring powers, particularly Russia and China. An efficient connection through the Caspian Sea and Türkiye would give them additional commercial choices.

For Türkiye, the corridor reinforces its ambition to become the principal gateway between Europe and Asia. For Azerbaijan, it creates the possibility of becoming a major logistics centre linking Central Asia with the Mediterranean and European markets.

The Ankara Declaration recognised the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway as a critical component of this network and supported further development of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway. It also endorsed closer coordination of customs procedures, digital transport documentation, and infrastructure investment, while encouraging preparation of a common transportation corridors strategy.

But the Middle Corridor is not yet a seamless commercial highway. Its future will depend on investments in ports, railway connections, logistics centres, and coordinated border management, as well as the political willingness of participating countries to treat transport as a shared economic enterprise.

Yıldırım offered perhaps the clearest explanation of what success should mean.

“The Middle Corridor is a corridor of prosperity, an economic corridor, a corridor of history, and a corridor of culture,” he told the forum.

He argued that the objective should not be confined to moving Chinese goods towards European markets. Joint production facilities and logistics hubs should be established along the route so that the countries through which it passes become producers rather than merely transit territories.

“We will measure the true success of the Middle Corridor by the investments it brings to our cities, the new markets it opens for our businesses, and the employment opportunities it creates for our youth,” he said.

Challenge to India’s IMEC

For South Asia, the growing importance of the Middle Corridor comes at a particularly interesting moment.

India had placed considerable diplomatic emphasis on the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), announced during the G20 summit in New Delhi in September 2023. The project envisaged linking Indian ports to Europe through the Arabian Peninsula, Israel, and the Mediterranean, and was presented as an alternative commercial network to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar with Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov during a meeting, in Baku, Azerbaijan, on October 23, 2026.
| Photo Credit:
@DrSJaishankar/X via PTI

However, the war in Gaza and subsequent regional instability have prevented IMEC from becoming an operational end-to-end corridor. The Middle Corridor, by contrast, is already functioning, although its capacity and efficiency remain limited. Its principal advantage is that it builds upon existing railways, ports, and commercial networks, rather than requiring an entirely new regional political arrangement.

For India, the situation is complicated by its traditional relationships with Russia and Iran, its investments in Iran’s Chabahar port, and its strategic rivalry with China. New Delhi has sought access to Central Asian markets without depending on Pakistan, while simultaneously attempting to maintain commercial and diplomatic relations with competing regional powers.

Azerbaijan has consequently acquired a new importance in Indian strategic calculations. The recent visit to Baku by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has demonstrated an engagement that shows Azerbaijan’s willingness to cultivate relationships independently of Ankara’s regional preferences.

For years, the Türkiye-Azerbaijan-Pakistan relationship had encouraged the impression of an emerging strategic triangle, reinforced by military cooperation and diplomatic coordination over Kashmir and the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan’s outreach to India suggests that this arrangement does not prevent Baku from pursuing its own commercial and political interests.

Erdoğan’s ambition

Among the transport projects discussed in Ankara, the proposed Zangezur connection through southern Armenia carries particular significance for Erdoğan.

The route is intended to connect mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave and onwards to Türkiye, creating an additional overland connection between Anatolia and the Turkic republics of Central Asia. It would supplement the existing route through Georgia and potentially strengthen the wider Middle Corridor.

For Erdoğan, the project has become something of a personal political ambition. Observers in Ankara believe he wants to be remembered in Turkish history as the leader who reconnected the geographically fragmented Turkic world, restoring direct links between Anatolia and Central Asia after generations of imperial collapse, Soviet rule, and closed borders.

When US President Donald Trump hosted Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan at the White House on August 8, 2025, the two leaders agreed to pursue this link under the name Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). On October 29, as Erdoğan hosted visiting leaders at a dinner marking Türkiye’s Republic Day, Trump telephoned him specifically to discuss the Organization of Turkic States gathering and this corridor.

Its implementation, however, depends on agreements involving Armenia, whose sovereignty and jurisdiction over the proposed route remain central to the arrangements. Iran also fears that new transportation arrangements along its northern frontier could diminish its transit importance and strengthen a Turkish-Azerbaijani network.

Conspicuous absence

These contradictions became visible at the Ankara summit itself, where Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev was conspicuous by his absence.

Azerbaijan had held the rotating presidency of the OTS and was expected to hand over its leadership to Türkiye. Yet Aliyev did not attend the gathering, sending Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov instead. Azerbaijani media attributed his absence to scheduling commitments, but the decision came amid unusually public friction between Ankara and Baku.

The immediate controversy concerned restrictions on headscarves in Azerbaijani schools, which provoked criticism among conservative political and religious circles in Türkiye. The issue carries particular historical sensitivity in Turkish politics because Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party built part of its political identity around challenging restrictions on Islamic dress.

Azerbaijan, however, has defended its secular political arrangements and rejected what it regards as interference in domestic affairs. The disagreement escalated into a diplomatic controversy, with Turkish presidential adviser Oktay Saral publicly criticising Baku before Erdoğan dismissed him.

But the tensions extend beyond religious dress.

Türkiye has taken an uncompromising public position against Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, with Erdoğan repeatedly accusing Israel of genocide and calling for stronger international action. Azerbaijan has maintained its strategic relationship with Israel, including energy supplies and defence cooperation, despite Ankara’s objections.

Baku has also pursued diplomatic contacts that do not always align with Turkish preferences, including its engagement with India and its approach towards Cyprus.

Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan shakes hands with Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov during a meeting of the Council of Leaders of the Organization of Turkic States in Ankara, Türkiye, on October 30, 2026.
| Photo Credit:
Murat Cetinmuhurdar/Turkish Presidential Press Office via Reuters

The relationship between Türkiye and Azerbaijan remains deeply institutionalised through military cooperation, energy pipelines, transportation infrastructure, and extensive political contacts. Aliyev’s absence therefore does not necessarily signal a strategic rupture, but it exposes the limits of the familiar description of the two countries as one nation, two states.

Erdoğan appeared to acknowledge the sensitivity when he told the summit: “There is no room for separation, division or discord in the family photo of the Turkic world.”

The practical importance of maintaining this relationship is difficult to exaggerate. Azerbaijan occupies the geographical hinge of the Middle Corridor, connecting the Caspian basin with Georgia and Türkiye. Without its active participation, the principal transportation network promoted in Ankara cannot function as envisaged.

Political geography of Turkic world

Unlike the Arab world, where most Arab-majority countries are independent and only Palestine remains under Israeli occupation, substantial parts of the historic Turkic world lie within the internationally recognised borders of Russia and China. Some Turkic nationalist movements describe these territories as occupied homelands.

Within Russia are Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chuvashia, Sakha or Yakutia, Tuva, Khakassia and Altai, all with significant Turkic-speaking populations. Dagestan, in the North Caucasus, is ethnically more diverse but includes substantial Kumyk and Nogai Turkic communities. Farther east, China’s Xinjiang region, known to many Turkic communities as East Turkistan, is home to Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Turkic-speaking peoples.

For these populations, the emergence of independent Turkic republics after the Soviet collapse represented a major historical change, but it did not create a single political space encompassing the entire Turkic world.

For South Asians, this geography is closer than it may initially appear. The historical connections extend to Ladakh and Kashmir, where caravan routes linked Leh with Yarkand, Kashgar, and other Central Asian commercial centres. Until the middle of the twentieth century, Turkic languages, particularly those associated with the Yarkandi trading communities, remained important in Ladakh’s commercial life. These connections were gradually weakened by the closure of traditional caravan routes and the political transformations that followed the partition of the Indian subcontinent and the consolidation of Chinese control over Xinjiang.

India’s Turkic connections also extend well beyond Ladakh. In 1206, more than a century before the Ottoman state emerged, Qutb ud-Din Aibak established the Turkic-led Delhi Sultanate. Even today, communities claiming Turkic ancestry live in towns such as Sambhal, Moradabad, Rampur, Amroha, and Nagina in Uttar Pradesh. Sambhal, sometimes called Little Türkiye, preserves traces of this heritage, including a fondness for çay, black tea served without milk or sugar.

Russia has adopted a more accommodating approach towards Türkiye’s contacts with its Turkic and Muslim populations than might be expected from its traditional suspicion of pan-Turkic political movements. Moscow has allowed considerable cultural, educational, religious, and commercial engagement, particularly where such activities operate within the framework of Russian sovereignty. Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan, hosts the annual Russia-Islamic World: KazanForum, which brings together officials, businesses, and institutions from Muslim countries, including Türkiye.

Türkiye’s Directorate of Religious Affairs, Diyanet, also maintains religious and educational contacts with Muslim institutions in Russia. These relationships have enabled Ankara to sustain connections with Turkic communities without challenging Moscow’s territorial authority.

At the Ankara summit, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev proposed exploring closer engagement with Russia through the OTS+ framework or an observer arrangement. The suggestion reflected the cautious approach of Central Asian governments, which seek stronger Turkic cooperation without jeopardising their relationships with Moscow or Beijing. China presents a sensitive question because of its treatment of Uyghurs and its opposition to political movements advocating rights for East Turkistan.

The Ankara summit also demonstrated that the OTS is moving beyond its original cultural and economic agenda into defence technology and security cooperation.

The declaration encouraged consideration of an OTS Defence Industry College in Türkiye, intended to promote technical training, professional exchanges and cooperation among defence manufacturers. Discussions also covered cybersecurity, information security, and the protection of strategic infrastructure.

At the Dialogue Forum, Japanese scholar Ken Moriyasu offered an interesting external perspective, arguing that the emergence of a stronger Turkic world could contribute to maintaining a balance of power in Asia. He pointed to visits by two Japanese defence ministers to Türkiye over the preceding two years as evidence of Tokyo’s growing interest in Turkish defence capabilities and the possibilities of technological cooperation.

Moriyasu suggested that Japan’s strengths in precision engineering, electronics and advanced manufacturing could complement Türkiye’s growing expertise in military drones and operational defence technologies. Using an analogy from Star Wars, he compared Turkish operational agility to an X-Wing fighter and Japanese technological support to the R2-D2 robot.

Hungarian participant David Biro emphasised industrial partnerships and capacity-building, while Uzbekistan’s Avazbek Abdulkhaev proposed an artificial intelligence-supported business platform that could help companies cooperate in technology production.

Common identity and language

Perhaps the most interesting discussions at the Dialogue Forum concerned how a common identity could be sustained beyond the meetings of presidents and foreign ministers.

Yıldırım proposed that Turkic countries send 10 per cent of their student populations to study in other OTS member countries, arguing that educational mobility could create a generation familiar with the languages, institutions and societies of the wider Turkic world. Students who study in neighbouring countries may eventually become the entrepreneurs, researchers, engineers, and administrators capable of building the networks envisaged by political leaders.

Turkic leaders during the inauguration ceremony of the Turkic States Civilization Park in Ankara, Türkiye, October 29, 2026.
| Photo Credit:
Murat Cetinmuhurdar/Turkish Presidential Press Office via Reuters

The summit’s endorsement of a proposed common 34-letter Turkic alphabet was another step towards reducing the barriers created by decades of political separation.

Türkiye and Azerbaijan use Latin-based writing systems, while several Central Asian languages have historically used Cyrillic scripts, with some countries undertaking transitions towards Latin-based alphabets. The Uygurs in Xinjiang have preserved Ottoman script.

The common alphabet is intended to facilitate the exchange of literature, educational material, scientific research, and digital content without erasing the linguistic distinctions among Turkic peoples.

Erdoğan connected this cultural ambition to the ideas of the Turkic intellectual Ismail Gaspirali, whose call for unity in language, thought, and action inspired the summit’s central theme. “Unity in language means keeping our common treasure alive, developing it and understanding each other without intermediaries,” Erdoğan told the gathering.

The declaration also supported development of a Digital Silk Road, including a proposed fibre-optic connection across the Caspian Sea between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. These initiatives reflect an ambition to make the Turkic world a producer of information, research, and technology rather than merely a consumer of systems developed elsewhere.

Also Read | Why Bangladesh is joining hands with Türkiye

As the proceedings concluded in Ankara, the contrast between ambition and implementation remained striking.

The OTS now possesses a broad institutional framework, an expanding economic agenda, and a geographical position that could become increasingly valuable as global trade routes diversify. Its members control significant energy and mineral resources, while Türkiye offers industrial capabilities and access to major international markets.

But the organisation also faces the familiar weaknesses of regional groupings: competing national interests, unequal economic development, overlapping security commitments and a tendency to adopt declarations whose implementation depends on governments with different priorities.

The experience of the Arab League offers both a warning and an opportunity. Oil gave Arab countries enormous wealth and influence, but it did not automatically produce political unity or technological independence. The Turkic states now have an opportunity to use natural gas, minerals, manufacturing, and transportation infrastructure as the foundations of a more diversified economic system.

The Middle Corridor offers the clearest immediate test. If it becomes a reliable and competitive transportation network, it could transform the economic prospects of Central Asia and strengthen Türkiye’s position in Eurasian commerce. If political disagreements, inadequate investment, and administrative obstacles persist, it may remain a promising but underdeveloped alternative to established routes.

Azerbaijan’s absence at the presidential level illustrated the fragility of political solidarity, but it did not diminish the underlying economic logic that brought the Turkic countries together.

The summit also witnessed the inauguration of the Turkic States Civilization Park near Ankara’s Presidential Complex. The park, part of the sprawling 645,000-square-metre Beştepe Nation’s Forest, features traditional Turkic tents, national pavilions and miniature representations of Turkic historic monuments. Intended to celebrate the shared cultural heritage of Turkic peoples, it offered a symbolic expression of the unity that Ankara hopes to translate into closer political and economic cooperation.

For South Asia, the emergence of this new Eurasian network offers opportunities as well as challenges. India will have to reconsider its commercial relationships with the Caucasus and Central Asia, while Pakistan could benefit from eventual connections between Central Asia, Afghanistan, and the Arabian Sea.

The larger significance of the Ankara summit lies in its attempt to move beyond the rhetoric of common ancestry towards the practical foundations of collective prosperity. Yıldırım’s observation that the sun rises in the East captured the optimism surrounding the gathering. But the history of the Arab oil economies suggests that geographical advantage and natural wealth are not sufficient to guarantee lasting power.

Iftikhar Gilani is an Indian journalist based in Ankara.