Editor’s note: Moses Becker is a special political commentator for News.Az. He holds a PhD in political science and specialises in inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of News.Az.
Over the past decade, global attention has largely focused on the economic rivalry between China and the United States. Against this backdrop, India remained outside the spotlight for a long time, even as it steadily strengthened its position not only in South Asia but also far beyond the subcontinent.
As one of the world’s fastest-growing major economies, India has sought to challenge China’s Belt and Road Initiative by proposing an alternative project — the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor, commonly known as IMEC.
At the G20 summit held in New Delhi in 2023, the project received the backing of the leaders of the United States, India, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, France, Germany and Italy, as well as the European Commission. The initiative envisages the creation of a large-scale transport and economic corridor linking India, the Middle East and Europe.
The proposed project consists of two main sections. The eastern route is expected to connect India with the Gulf states by sea, while the northern route would transport goods from Saudi Arabia to Europe via Jordan and Israel using a combination of rail and maritime links.
The project aims to connect the major commercial centres of Asia and Europe, facilitate clean energy exports, stimulate trade and industrial production, and strengthen food security. IMEC is expected to reduce transit times between India and Europe by approximately 40 per cent and transport costs by around 30 per cent.
Photo: Reuters
The corridor will comprise a network of railway lines and shipping routes, as well as high-speed data cables and energy pipelines linking India, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel and Europe.
One of IMEC’s key strategic hubs is expected to be the Israeli port of Haifa. In 2022, a consortium comprising India’s Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Ltd (APSEZ) and Israel’s Gadot Group won a $1.2 billion tender to privatise the port. The Indian company acquired a 70 per cent stake, while Gadot Group received the remaining 30 per cent.
However, implementation of the project affects the interests of several regional powers. It has provoked a particularly negative reaction from Iran and its allies, primarily because of Israel’s participation in the initiative following the signing of the Abraham Accords with several Arab countries.
Tehran was also concerned by Saudi Arabia’s involvement, as the kingdom appeared at the time to be moving closer to a possible normalisation agreement with Israel. It cannot be ruled out that the prospect of further Arab-Israeli rapprochement was among the factors that influenced Hamas’s decision to attack Israel on 7 October 2023.
For the United States, IMEC is a project through which Washington hopes to preserve its influence in the Middle East amid growing competition from China, which has been actively expanding its relations with Iran and other regional states.
It should also be noted that a significant share of trade between India and the European Union passes through the Suez Canal. Recent events have demonstrated that the security of this route can be threatened by Iran-backed forces, particularly Yemen’s Houthis. This is one of the main reasons why establishing an alternative trade and transport route is so important for New Delhi.
One of IMEC’s primary objectives is to ease pressure on existing transport routes. The project would strengthen India’s strategic and economic ties with the Gulf states, the United States and Europe. The corridor is also intended to complement minilateral formats such as I2U2, which brings together India, Israel, the United States and the UAE.
Türkiye has emerged as one of the project’s most consistent opponents. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly insisted that “there can be no corridor without Türkiye”. As an alternative, Ankara is promoting the Development Road project, designed to connect the Gulf with Europe through a network of railways and motorways running across Iraq and Türkiye.
A central component of this route is expected to be Iraq’s Grand Faw Port, which is currently under construction. It could eventually be integrated into the transport infrastructure of the UAE, Qatar, Iraq and Türkiye. Ankara is therefore seeking to establish itself as one of the region’s principal logistics hubs.
Türkiye’s broader objective, however, extends beyond developing its own transport infrastructure. Ankara also seeks to prevent major trade routes from bypassing its territory, retain influence over critical logistics chains and minimise Israel’s role.
Egypt, for its part, has legitimate grounds to regard IMEC as a potential competitor to the Suez Canal, revenues from which are of strategic importance to the Egyptian economy.
Photo: Reuters
The scale of trade among the project’s potential participants demonstrates the economic significance of the Indian initiative. In 2022, the European Union imported goods worth $46.22 billion from Saudi Arabia, while EU exports to the kingdom totalled $32.81 billion.
EU exports to the UAE reached $37.38 billion, while imports from the Emirates stood at approximately $14.7 billion. At the same time, India has steadily strengthened its trade and economic relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan and Israel, reinforcing New Delhi’s position as one of the region’s key partners.
The participating countries therefore have considerable economic and political incentives to work together to bring IMEC to fruition.
The initiative has emerged amid a profound transformation of the global order. The rapidly developing economies of India, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are becoming important elements of an evolving geopolitical system that could encompass the countries of the region regardless of their ideological positions or religious outlooks.
IMEC is consistent with Washington’s strategy of preventing powers such as China, Russia and Iran from dominating the Middle East. Iran, in particular, is viewed by the United States and its allies as a major source of regional instability, especially given the development of its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE, meanwhile, regard IMEC as a means of modernising their infrastructure, diversifying their economies, introducing innovative technologies and gradually reducing their dependence on raw-material exports.
The project’s continued relevance is demonstrated by the gradual development of its individual components. In April 2025, construction reportedly began on several key infrastructure projects, including railway lines, ports and motorways.
The most visible progress has been made along the eastern section between India and the UAE. A virtual trade corridor is effectively taking shape between the ports of Mundra, Jawaharlal Nehru and Jebel Ali Port, supported by the digitalisation of customs procedures and the real-time exchange of data.
The bilateral Intergovernmental Framework Agreement between India and the UAE, which has been in force since 2024, provides an institutional foundation for this part of IMEC.
At the same time, implementation of the northern section continues to face serious challenges. The principal diplomatic obstacle remains the proposed railway connection running from the UAE through Saudi Arabia and Jordan to the Israeli port of Haifa.
The war in the Gaza Strip, which began in 2023, brought the process of normalisation between Israel and the Arab states to a halt. Such normalisation had been one of the key political prerequisites for the project’s full implementation.
Saudi Arabia’s position remains the principal stumbling block. Without the normalisation of Saudi-Israeli relations, the western section of IMEC cannot be implemented in the form originally envisaged.
Further obstacles include Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, instability in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen, as well as the continuing tensions surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme.
Nevertheless, the concept of IMEC remains at the centre of international attention, as demonstrated by discussions among European participants at the 2026 Munich Security Conference. Under the current circumstances, the emphasis has shifted from immediate implementation of the entire project to a more modular approach.
This means that, rather than waiting for a major political breakthrough encompassing the entire corridor, priority will be given to those segments that are already politically acceptable, economically viable and logistically operational.
Given the complexity of the Middle East, IMEC represents a promising initiative with the potential to reshape the geo-economic landscape of the entire region. Its implementation could create significant opportunities for economic growth, infrastructure development and stronger international cooperation.
However, IMEC’s success will ultimately depend on the ability of the participating countries to overcome religious and ideological divisions, refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of neighbouring states, and abandon attempts to impose their own political models and ways of life on others.
(If you possess specialized knowledge and wish to contribute, please reach out to us at [email protected]).
