As geopolitical tensions reshape trade routes, energy markets and alliances across Eurasia, Central Asia and the South Caucasus are gaining strategic importance. At the centre of these developments is Azerbaijan, whose position on the Caspian Sea and growing ties with Central Asian countries are strengthening its role as a key bridge between Europe and Asia.
The development of the Middle Corridor, Europe’s search for alternative energy and transport routes, and intensifying competition among major powers are creating new opportunities for Baku, while also presenting new geopolitical challenges. How sustainable is Azerbaijan’s growing strategic importance, and can the country translate its geographical position into lasting political and economic influence?
In an interview with News.Az, Fabrizio Vielmini, an analyst at Vision & Global Trends – International Institute for Global Analyses, based in Rome, discusses Europe’s evolving approach to the region, Azerbaijan’s growing role in Eurasian connectivity, Türkiye’s influence, and the prospects for the Middle Corridor.
– How would you characterise the current stage of development in Central Asia and the South Caucasus?
– Since the outbreak of the full-scale war in Ukraine in February 2022, followed by the Israeli-American aggression against Iran, Central Asia and the South Caucasus have found themselves increasingly exposed to geopolitical turbulence. Paradoxically, however, being at the centre of this highly volatile geopolitical storm has also created significant opportunities for the countries of both regions.
The disruption of established trade routes, the reconfiguration of energy markets and the introduction of Western sanctions against Russia have redirected trade and investment flows through alternative channels, benefiting several regional economies. Central Asia and the South Caucasus have become increasingly important transit hubs, logistical corridors and potential gateways connecting Europe and Asia. Their strategic significance has grown further as major powers seek to diversify energy supplies, secure access to critical raw materials, develop alternative transport routes and strengthen their political and economic presence in Eurasia.
Source: caspianpost.com
At the same time, the sanctions environment has generated new commercial opportunities, including an expansion of intermediary trade with Russia. Some of these flows have raised concerns among Western governments about sanctions circumvention. Yet this illustrates a broader structural reality: regional economies do not operate in isolation from their larger neighbours, and attempts to reorganise Eurasian commerce inevitably produce both intended and unintended consequences.
So far, the governments of the eight countries have made positive use of this conjuncture. Having visited most of their capitals in recent years, I have observed tangible changes in infrastructure, urban development, commercial activity and the general economic environment. In several countries, economic growth and rising incomes have contributed to improvements in living standards for significant segments of the population, although the benefits remain unevenly distributed and structural inequalities persist.
However, the real question is how long this can last and whether it is sustainable. The longer-term consequences of the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have yet to become fully apparent. Prolonged instability could disrupt trade, undermine investor confidence, increase transport and insurance costs, and expose the countries of both regions to competing demands from their international partners. The risks are particularly significant for smaller economies whose development strategies depend heavily on external markets, energy exports, remittances or transit revenues.
– How has the strategic importance of these regions to Europe changed since the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine conflict?
– Europe’s strategic interest in Central Asia and the South Caucasus has increased considerably since the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, although this should not be mistaken for an entirely new development. Since the end of the Cold War, European engagement with these regions has gone through successive phases of enthusiasm, relative neglect and renewed attention. What we are witnessing today is the latest, and potentially most intense, phase in this fluctuating relationship.
The first major wave of Western interest emerged in the context of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan and NATO’s broader military engagement in the region. Once the immediate strategic imperatives of that period diminished, European attention receded and engagement became more selective.
The current phase is driven by several overlapping considerations. The first is access to natural resources. Energy security remains important following the rejection of Russian supplies, but the European agenda has expanded to include uranium, critical raw materials and rare earth elements, all of which are increasingly relevant to Europe’s dwindling economies.
The second consideration is geopolitical. The conflict in Ukraine has reinforced the tendency to view Central Asia and the South Caucasus as platforms for confrontation with Russia. This approach has been influenced, in part, by the enlargement of the European Union to include former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, whose historical experiences and security perceptions have contributed to a more confrontational understanding of relations with Moscow. These perspectives have increasingly shaped the EU’s broader foreign policy debate, although European governments continue to differ in their priorities and preferred approaches.
Source: Adobe Stock
The war in Ukraine has accelerated the search for alternative trade routes between Europe and Asia, particularly those crossing the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus. The so-called Middle Corridor has consequently attracted greater attention as a means of connecting European markets with China and Central Asia while bypassing both Russia and Iran.
In this sense, there is a contradiction at the heart of the European approach. Brussels presents its engagement as a win-win partnership based on connectivity, diversification and economic modernisation, but its geopolitical thinking risks overlooking the priorities and sensitivities of its prospective partners. These countries do not want to serve as geopolitical pawns and, although wary of neo-imperialism, are free from Russophobic and anti-Iranian biases.
Ultimately, the crucial question is whether this renewed interest will lead to a sustained European commitment to the region’s long-term development or remain largely contingent on the immediate circumstances of the conflict with Russia. The answer will depend on Europe’s ability to move beyond geopolitical competition and offer a consistent, economically credible partnership that remains valuable even if the international context changes.
– Does Europe have a long-term strategy for these two regions, or does its policy still consist of a series of separate initiatives that are not always well co-ordinated?
– It is difficult to identify a genuinely long-term strategic vision in the actions of the current European leadership, either towards Central Asia and the South Caucasus or more broadly. The EU has produced numerous strategies and partnership initiatives, but these often appear fragmented and subordinated to immediate geopolitical priorities and shifting alignments in Brussels rather than being integrated into a coherent foreign policy.
The escalation of the conflict in Ukraine has exposed the limitations of European strategic autonomy. The increasingly confrontational approach towards Russia, the exclusion of Russian resources from Europe’s economic future, and the resulting dependence on American energy supplies and security guarantees raise serious questions about the EU’s capacity to defend its own long-term interests, particularly as Washington becomes increasingly unpredictable and redirects its attention towards other theatres.
This strategic weakness is epitomised, in my view, by EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, whose personal limitations, combined with her hard-line approach towards Russia, reflect a broader European tendency to prioritise confrontation over diplomatic flexibility.
The same contradictions affect European policy towards Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Brussels seeks access to resources, alternative transport corridors and greater geopolitical influence, but its initiatives risk becoming instruments of confrontation with Moscow rather than building blocks for sustainable regional partnerships.
A genuine long-term strategy would require greater co-ordination, economic pragmatism and recognition that these countries have their own interests and will not automatically align themselves with European geopolitical priorities. Ultimately, I believe the EU cannot become an effective and lasting player in these regions without finding ways to co-operate with Moscow. Otherwise, its engagement will remain vulnerable to shifting geopolitical circumstances.
– To what extent is the strengthening of ties between Azerbaijan and Central Asia reshaping the traditional perception of the South Caucasus as a distinct geopolitical region? Is the Caspian Sea becoming a central link in a broader Eurasian system?
– The strengthening of ties between Azerbaijan and Central Asia is undoubtedly creating a new dimension in regional dynamics. Azerbaijan is increasingly acting as a bridge between the South Caucasus and Central Asia, while the Caspian Sea is becoming a central link in a broader Eurasian system of trade, energy and transport connectivity. This development challenges the traditional perception of the South Caucasus as a distinct geopolitical region and places it within a wider framework extending towards Central Asia and beyond.
Source: dredfern.substack.com
– What role does Türkiye play in reshaping the regional balance of power? Can we speak of the emergence of a unified Turkic space for co-operation capable of becoming an independent actor in Eurasian politics?
– Türkiye plays an important role in this process through its political, economic and cultural ties with Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics. However, I remain sceptical that these connections will produce a unified Turkic space capable of acting as an independent geopolitical actor. The differences in national interests, foreign policy priorities, economic structures and relations with Russia, China and other powers among the eight countries of the region are simply too significant.
Moreover, the promotion of Turkic solidarity can provoke counter-reactions among neighbouring countries if it is perceived as an expression of Pan-Turkism or as a challenge to their own security interests. Rather than fostering co-operation, such perceptions could deepen regional divisions and generate new tensions.
I would not exclude the possibility that certain Western strategic circles seek to exploit these dynamics in pursuit of traditional geopolitical objectives reminiscent of the Great Game. However, the essential question is whether regional co-operation will develop as an inclusive framework for connectivity and economic development or be instrumentalised as a means of geopolitical confrontation.
Ultimately, a durable Eurasian partnership must accommodate the legitimate interests of all regional actors. The Caspian can become a bridge connecting regions and economies, but whether it serves co-operation or competition will depend on the political choices of the countries concerned.
– Could the development of the Middle Corridor enhance Azerbaijan’s political weight in its relations with the EU? What economic and diplomatic advantages could Baku gain in the long term?
– Certainly. In the current geopolitical conjuncture, the development of the Middle Corridor can significantly enhance Azerbaijan’s political weight in its relations with the European Union. By connecting Central Asia to European markets through the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan is strengthening its position as a strategic transit hub and an increasingly important partner in Europe’s efforts to diversify trade routes and energy supplies.
In the long term, Baku could benefit from increased transit revenues, infrastructure investment, expanded trade and greater diplomatic leverage. Its importance would extend beyond energy exports to encompass logistics, regional connectivity and access to Central Asian markets.
Source: swp-berlin.org
However, these opportunities must be viewed against considerable uncertainties. The corridor’s long-term viability will depend on sustained investment, co-ordination among the countries involved, competition from alternative routes and the evolution of relations among major powers.
Azerbaijan can undoubtedly capitalise on its current strategic position, but transforming this advantage into lasting influence will require a diversified economy and a pragmatic foreign policy. The present conjuncture offers significant opportunities, but it does not guarantee their permanence.