“Achilles shield” against Turkish influence: Why Athens is overlooking the Azerbaijan factor

Editor’s note: Zaur Nurmamedov is a journalist and a graduate of the Faculty of Political Science at the Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (1993–1999). He previously served as first deputy editor-in-chief of the Vesti.Az news portal (2009–2023). The views expressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily reflect the position of News.Az.

The anticipated signing in Tel Aviv of an agreement between Israel and Greece to create the “Achilles Shield” air and missile defence system, worth approximately €3.1 billion, goes far beyond an ordinary defence contract. Behind what is formally presented as a defensive project lies a broader political process: the continued rapprochement between Athens and Tel Aviv as Greece seeks to strengthen its position in the Eastern Mediterranean, where Türkiye has significantly expanded its military and political influence in recent years.

According to Israeli media reports, implementation of the project is expected to begin almost immediately after the agreement is signed and take approximately 35 months. However, the significance of the deal is not determined by its cost alone. The “Achilles Shield” is becoming part of Greece’s large-scale rearmament programme, aimed at creating a multilayered system to protect its airspace and maritime domain by integrating radars, sensors and various air and missile defence assets into a single network.

Digital technologies and elements of artificial intelligence are expected to play an important role in this architecture. Their purpose will be to accelerate the detection and classification of targets, as well as decision-making in situations where modern drones, missiles and other weapons reduce reaction time to an absolute minimum.

Yet behind this technological modernisation lies a clear geopolitical logic. Greece is attempting to compensate for a military and strategic balance that has increasingly shifted to its disadvantage. In recent years, Türkiye has substantially strengthened its domestic defence industry, developing the production of drones, missiles, warships and other weapons systems. At the same time, Ankara has expanded the capabilities of its naval and air forces.

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Whereas Türkiye once depended heavily on foreign supplies, it is now increasingly emerging as an independent centre of military production. This gives Ankara greater freedom to pursue its own policies and reduces its dependence on decisions made by external suppliers.

For Athens, this transformation necessitates a reassessment of its previous security model. Greece, with its extensive coastline and numerous islands, is seeking a more resilient defence system capable of countering a wide range of threats. This is precisely why Israeli technologies are particularly attractive to Athens.

The modernisation of the Greek armed forces is not, in itself, a problem. As a NATO member, Greece has every right to strengthen its defence capabilities. The real question is whether this strengthening is becoming part of a broader policy aimed at shaping a regional configuration designed to constrain Turkish influence.

Greek-Israeli defence cooperation has been developing for several years. Athens has been acquiring Israeli weapons and technologies, while Tel Aviv has gained an opportunity to strengthen its position in the European defence market. Gradually, however, this cooperation has acquired an increasingly political dimension.

For Israel, Greece is valuable not only as a purchaser of weapons but also as an important partner in the Eastern Mediterranean. For Athens, Israel is becoming a source of technology capable of compensating for Greece’s limitations in certain defence sectors.

The intersection of the two countries’ interests in energy and regional influence is particularly significant. The Eastern Mediterranean remains an arena of competition over maritime boundaries, potential gas reserves, transport routes and infrastructure projects. Defence cooperation is therefore increasingly overlapping with a much broader political context.

This raises the central question: how realistic is it to expect the creation of a sustainable regional security architecture if deterring Türkiye becomes one of its principal elements?

Ankara is one of the largest military and political powers in the Eastern Mediterranean. Its geographical position, role within NATO, control over the Turkish Straits, and direct interests in the Black Sea, the Aegean, Cyprus and the Middle East make Türkiye a country that simply cannot be removed from the equation. An attempt to construct a security system around an Athens–Tel Aviv axis without fully considering Ankara’s interests may therefore fail to eliminate existing tensions and instead merely give them a new form.

This is precisely where Azerbaijan assumes particular importance. The strategic partnership between Ankara and Baku has expanded far beyond conventional bilateral cooperation in recent years. Türkiye and Azerbaijan are forming an increasingly close military, political, energy and transport partnership linking the Eastern Mediterranean with the South Caucasus and the Caspian region.

For Türkiye, Azerbaijan matters not only as a security ally. Baku is a crucial link in the formation of the East–West geo-economic axis. Energy and transport routes passing through Azerbaijan connect the Caspian region with Türkiye and, from there, with European markets.

Credit: Report

The Southern Gas Corridor, the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway and the development of the Middle Corridor all enhance the strategic importance of this wider space. Cooperation in electricity and new energy projects is also expanding. As a result, Ankara–Baku relations are gradually assuming the character of long-term infrastructural interdependence.

This is essential to understanding the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkish influence cannot be measured solely by the number of warships, aircraft or drones at Ankara’s disposal. Türkiye’s strategic strength lies in its ability to combine military, energy, transport and economic instruments while operating simultaneously across several geographical directions.

Within this system, Azerbaijan is becoming a crucial component of Türkiye’s strategic depth. Baku, in turn, gains additional opportunities through Türkiye to access European markets, develop transport routes and strengthen its own regional influence. Any attempt to contain Türkiye exclusively in the Mediterranean therefore encounters the objective realities of geography. Ankara possesses room for manoeuvre stretching from the Black Sea and the Caucasus to the Caspian region, Central Asia and Europe.

It is this reality that makes the Greek-Israeli “Achilles Shield” both a technologically significant and geopolitically limited project. Greece may indeed acquire one of the most advanced air defence systems in the region. Israel will strengthen its position in the European arms market. Athens will be able to raise the cost of potential military action and improve the protection of its territory.

However, a missile defence system cannot alter fundamental geopolitical realities. Moreover, an excessive reliance on military deterrence could trigger a new arms race. In the absence of trust, one side’s strengthening is perceived by the other as a threat, creating incentives for further military build-up.

For Türkiye, the most sensitive issue is therefore not Greek rearmament itself. Far more important is whether it becomes part of a strategy aimed at creating a regional security system without Ankara’s full participation.

Such an approach has an obvious limitation. Türkiye cannot be excluded from the security architecture of the Eastern Mediterranean because its interests and capabilities extend far beyond the Aegean Sea. Moreover, its close partnership with Azerbaijan expands the geographical area across which Ankara can pursue its economic and strategic interests.

The Türkiye–Azerbaijan partnership is therefore becoming one of the key factors shaping the new regional balance. Baku can no longer be viewed exclusively as a South Caucasus state, just as Ankara cannot be regarded solely as one of the parties to the Greek-Turkish dispute. Together, they are forming an increasingly important strategic space linking the Caspian region, the South Caucasus, Türkiye and European markets. Within this system, military cooperation is reinforced by energy, transport and trade.

This fundamentally changes the scale of what is taking place. While Greece and Israel are creating a new defence configuration in the Eastern Mediterranean, Türkiye and Azerbaijan are strengthening a different system of connections extending across a far broader geographical area.

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The question, therefore, is no longer simply whether “Achilles Shield” will be capable of intercepting missiles and drones. The more important issue is whether a single defence project can alter the regional balance when the opposing side is backed by an extensive network of political, energy, transport and defence-industrial ties.

So far, there is little reason to believe that it can. Greece is acquiring a new defensive instrument, and Israel is expanding its influence, but Türkiye continues to consolidate its position as an independent centre of power. At the same time, its strategic partnership with Azerbaijan gives Ankara additional room for manoeuvre and connects its interests with wider processes in the South Caucasus, the Caspian region and Central Asia.

This is the central paradox of “Achilles Shield”. The more it is perceived as an instrument for containing Türkiye, the greater the need becomes to account for the very processes that lie beyond its immediate area of operation.

The true balance of power in the region is no longer determined by individual missile systems. It is shaped by geography, energy resources, transport corridors, industrial capacity and the ability of states to build lasting alliances. In this respect, Türkiye possesses an advantage that cannot be offset solely through the acquisition of new air defence systems.

Its strategic partnership with Azerbaijan is transforming the Caspian–Caucasus–Türkiye nexus into one of the key components of the emerging Eurasian space. “Achilles Shield” may therefore become an effective defensive tool for Greece, but it is unlikely to become a geopolitical shield capable of halting the growth of Turkish influence.

Sustainable security in the Eastern Mediterranean cannot be built on an attempt to isolate Türkiye. Nor can Azerbaijan be ignored, given its growing importance to regional energy and transport processes. If the genuine objective is long-term stability, the strengthening of military capabilities must be followed by political dialogue.

Otherwise, the Eastern Mediterranean risks acquiring not a new security system but several competing architectures, each perceiving the strengthening of the others as a threat.

The future of the region will therefore depend not only on how effective “Achilles Shield” proves to be, but also on whether its creators are prepared to acknowledge an obvious geopolitical reality: Türkiye and Azerbaijan have already become part of a single strategic equation, without which no sustainable order can be established either in the Eastern Mediterranean or across the wider space between the Caspian Sea and Europe.

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