Despite Ankara’s formal stance and its miscalculated approach towards Jerusalem, third-party states continue to supply the country with Israeli-made goods. After imposing a so-called embargo on exports to and imports from Israel, it is reported, the Jewish State imported $924 million worth of goods from Türkiye in 2025, defying the official rhetoric of the AKP-led Turkish government, which has now made Israel public enemy number one. Conversely, Israeli exports to Türkiye amounted to nearly $11 million, after experiencing a freefall from $598.6 million in 2024. In addition to these relatively positive trade and economic ties, political relations have plummeted to an all-time low due to disagreements over the future of Gaza and Syria, where the state interests of the two regional powers intersect in opposite directions.
To satisfy Türkiye’s domestic audience, President Erdoğan has purportedly utilized third-party states such as Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, Georgia, and Azerbaijan to import essential Israeli products, thereby adding logistical costs, while simultaneously pressuring Azerbaijan to cut off all trading ties in the energy and defence sectors. Such hawkish policies imposed by Türkiye have not gone down well in Baku, given Azerbaijan’s staunchly held principle of neutrality in international affairs. Nevertheless, the Azerbaijan–Israel alliance has continued to develop in good faith and with reliability, marked by ministerial visits, including Azerbaijani Minister of Defence Zakir Hasanov’s visit to Tel Aviv and Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar’s visit to Baku, where he was platformed to challenge the idea of emerging empires in the Middle East.
From the red line over Syria to ‘secretive’ trade relations, Ankara’s prudence on the Palestinian issue has become way too costly to maintain for several reasons.
- The entirety of the Arab World no longer sees ‘the Palestinian issue’ as an Arab cause.
- The Muslim World enjoys having economic relations with Jerusalem, particularly Azerbaijan, the UAE, Kazakhstan and Morocco.
- Türkiye’s refusal to communicate directly with its Israeli counterparts only leads to miscommunication and erosion of influence in the aftermath of the Gaza War.
Generally, the neo-Ottoman foreign policy of the Republic of Türkiye, aimed at asserting influence across the MENA region, has backfired in numerous cases. It is not unreasonable for Ankara to insist on a future role in Gaza or elsewhere, particularly in light of statements by the Israeli government, which has articulated a clear objective of disarming Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups.
The trajectory of Israel–Türkiye relations suggests that another reconciliation may emerge in the interest of both countries’ security, recalling the warmer ties enjoyed during the informal alignment between the governments of David Ben-Gurion and Adnan Menderes (The Peripheral Pact). However, developments in Iran and the upcoming Turkish elections may prove detrimental to such a rapprochement.
The region may either witness competitive alignment between two blocs, Türkiye, Pakistan, and Qatar on one side, and Israel, the UAE, and Somaliland on the other, competing for regional dominance, or move towards an American-managed regional order in which major powers coordinate security arrangements concerning Syria, Iraq, and Iran with like-minded partners. However, the US/Israel’s operation ‘Roaring Lion‘ to eliminate the Iranian threats may alter the future of the region, with countries such as Israel, KSA, UAE, and Qatar facing retaliatory attacks from the Islamic regime.
Albeit remaining largely neutral or in favour of the Islamic Republic, Türkiye was also targeted alongside the Republic of Azerbaijan, whose Nakhchivan Region (Autonomous Republic) was targeted in an Iranian drone strike in addition to foiled terrorist attacks on the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and the Jewish religious centres in Baku. These attacks on two brotherly nations changed the rhetoric in both Baku and Ankara. President Aliyev called these attacks on Nakhchivan Airport and Shakarabad village in Babek District an act of terrorism.
Having suffered from the same type of Shiite terrorism from Iran, Türkiye (a Sunni-majority country) will have to reconfigure its foreign policy towards the State of Israel, where there is growing scepticism about AKP’s anti-Israel policies aimed at designating Israel as ‘Public Enemy No 1’ to satisfy the religious factions of the Turkish society. These developments will have to serve the mutual interests of both Israel and Türkiye in Syria and Azerbaijan, a country with equally close ties to Jerusalem and Ankara. The recent decision of the Trump Administration to export 27,000 Turkish-made bombs to Israel could be a positive step taken to reconcile Ankara with Jerusalem, which is an interaction these two nations will have to make in the region.
‘Recent decision of the Trump Administration to export 27,000 Turkish-made bombs to Israel could be a positive step taken to reconcile Ankara with Jerusalem’
The Muslim Brotherhood factions within Türkiye may not agree to a reapproachement, but there are definitely senior establishment figures, such as Ibrahim Kalin, who understand the role of intelligence cooperation against the Shiite terrorism in the broader region. After eliminating the former Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, Israel is now poised to be the regional power, projecting its military power from Beirut to Tehran. Ensuring the safety of Jewish minorities in the region, Jerusalem does not view anyone as a threat except for the ‘Islamic Regime’, whose oppression of 35 million ethnic Azerbaijani Turks is now viewed destructively by Ankara.
Even though Türkiye’s official position is more neutral on the Iran War, with some statements made to prevent Iran from attacking NATO bases in the country, which did not prove successful, they also perceive the ‘Islamic Regime’ as a threat to the region, given that Türkiye and Azerbaijan are equally concerned by the treatment of ethnic Turks in Iran as well as their support for the former Syrian dictator Bashar Al Assad whom President Erdogan labelled a terrorist in various occasion. It is no secret that Israel played a pivotal role in the removal of the ‘Assad Regime’ and deployed fighter jets to halt Iranian support for the continuation of Assad’s reign. This is how Türkiye-backed Ahmed al-Sharaa rose to be the interim President of the Syrian Arab Republic.
In spite of disagreements and strong-worded statements, the Turkish Government is advised to recalibrate its Israel policy, as it is an old and mutually beneficial partnership between Ankara and Jerusalem. Both countries’ security depends on regional security and integration, where trade and people-to-people connections in tourism and education matter financially.
The first steps to be taken in this direction are to give up on the diplomatic support of Türkiye for Hamas, which is Israel’s complete red line after the 7 October terrorist attacks. From a historical standpoint, Türkiye has been a secular state where Jews were sheltered in the Ottoman era. Hence, there is a strong chance that the current state policies of the country in aiding Hamas both diplomatically and financially, through ‘humanitarian’ organizations and state-owned banks, will have to cease before trust between the Israeli and Turkish governments is restored.
Türkiye itself was targeted in numerous terrorist attacks by the PKK, whose leader, Abdullah Öcalan (Apo), was captured with the intel support of the CIA and Mossad. These common traumas should help the two countries understand each other and cherish the once-fruitful relations they had.
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