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Recent upheavals in the Middle East have exposed the region’s geographical vulnerabilities, particularly those of the Gulf, where energy, trade and security routes have come under severe pressure in recent years. These developments have revealed the limits of relying on a geographical area so vulnerable to chokepoints, conflict and regional tensions. Gulf states are increasingly seeking alternatives that give them more room for manoeuvre and greater flexibility in responding to crises.
Over recent decades, Gulf states have not treated geography as a fixed constraint they cannot overcome. Oil-producing states that accumulated vast financial surpluses from oil and gas revenues began devoting a growing share of those funds to addressing their geographical limitations. They have bought agricultural assets abroad, invested in ports and logistics corridors, and acquired energy, mining, storage and transport facilities around the world.
In this series, “Alternative geography”, we examine the network of assets, corridors and facilities owned by Gulf states, their sovereign wealth funds and state-owned companies beyond their borders. These form an economic and strategic extension intended to offset some of the weaknesses of their own geography and reduce their exposure to crises.
The series asks a central question: have these overseas investments given Gulf states greater security and flexibility, or have they merely transferred some of their vulnerabilities to foreign ports, roads, markets, governments and conflict zones? More simply, have Gulf states reduced their dependence on nearby chokepoints, or replaced them with more distant ones over which they have less direct control?
This introductory article examines the different dimensions of “alternative geography”: the networks of assets, resources and corridors that Gulf states own beyond their national territory. It explores what compelled them to expand in this way and how successive regional and international crises have made these projects a greater strategic priority.
What is alternative geography?
Alternative geography describes a state’s ability to overcome some of its geographical vulnerabilities by owning or managing assets and projects beyond its borders. These vulnerabilities may stem from limited resources, internal crises or regional and international turmoil. The overseas assets can include agricultural land, ports, mines, energy facilities, and transport and communications networks.
These assets serve as an economic and strategic extension of the state, providing resources, routes or markets that are not sufficiently available within its territory. In practical terms, alternative geography turns capital and foreign investment into a means of extending a state’s geographical reach. A state with limited agricultural land or water invests in farmland and agricultural projects abroad. One whose maritime corridors or trade routes are vulnerable to congestion seeks to invest in alternative ports and routes. A state that lacks strategic minerals or raw materials expands its ownership or financing of mines and extraction projects in other countries.
Under this definition, alternative geography does not mean literally escaping a state’s location or creating new sovereign territories beyond its borders. It means reducing dependence on domestic geography and spreading resources, sources of power and risks across several regions, giving the state more room for manoeuvre during a crisis.
The Gulf’s alternative geography takes many forms, but can be divided into three main categories. The first is the geography of resources: investments in agricultural land, livestock farms, grain and meat companies, mines and sources of raw materials. The second is the geography of corridors: ports, container terminals, logistics zones, fleets, warehouses, railways and other infrastructure that keeps goods, energy and trade moving. The third is the geography of production and markets: refineries, liquefied natural gas terminals, and energy and industrial projects established near consumer markets, rather than concentrating every stage of production and export in the Gulf.
The success of any alternative geography strategy is therefore measured not by the size of the investment alone, but by its ability to meet three connected objectives: securing the resource, ensuring a route for its delivery and gaining direct access to the market. Owning a resource without a safe means of transporting it is insufficient, just as securing a corridor without reaching the final market falls short of the strategic goal.
A longstanding strategy
Gulf states began pursuing alternative geography long before the US-Israeli war on Tehran and the subsequent, separate attacks by Iran and the Houthis on countries in the region. The strategy dates back many years and reflects an early awareness of the constraints imposed by Gulf geography. Although Gulf states possess some of the world’s largest oil and gas reserves, they operate in a highly vulnerable geographical environment characterised by aridity, limited freshwater, scarce arable land and heavy dependence on maritime routes to export energy and import food, goods and raw materials.
The strategic position of the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb adds to this vulnerability. Both are major transit points for energy and trade moving to and from the Gulf. Diversifying supply routes and investing in resources and assets abroad were therefore part of Gulf economic security planning even before the current war.
But the US-Israeli war on Iran, and the profound change it brought to the region’s geopolitical environment, pushed the issue to the top of the agenda. Attacks on oil and gas facilities, disruption to maritime corridors and strikes on some pipelines and refineries showed that the challenge was no longer simply how much energy Gulf states could produce, but whether they could deliver it to markets reliably and safely. The central question shifted from how much oil and gas Gulf states possess to a more pressing concern: how can they export what they produce if the surrounding transport and energy infrastructure is disrupted?
The Gulf energy system’s vulnerability
The war exposed the Gulf energy system’s vulnerability to military and security disruptions. According to international estimates, the global energy market initially lost about 10 million barrels a day in supply, one of the most severe supply shocks of the current crisis. The World Bank also expected energy prices to rise by about 24 per cent in 2026, with Brent crude averaging around $94 a barrel. Under a more severe scenario, it could reach about $115 if damage to facilities persists and export disruptions last longer.
These figures reflect more than the war’s impact on global markets. They also reveal the scale of the costs borne by Gulf economies, where parts of the production and export infrastructure came under direct pressure, raising existential questions about their economic future.
Saudi Arabia: the alternative route comes under pressure
As the world’s largest oil exporter, Saudi Arabia faced one of the most severe tests of its energy system. Attacks hit fields, processing facilities, refineries and pipelines, reducing production capacity by about 600,000 barrels a day. Roughly 300,000 barrels a day were lost at the Manifa field, with about the same amount lost at the Khurais facility.
Oil flows through the East-West pipeline also fell by about 700,000 barrels a day after several pumping stations were targeted. The pipeline is Saudi Arabia’s most important alternative route for bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. The kingdom had been transporting about 4 million barrels a day through it to the west coast, equivalent to about 4 per cent of global oil supplies. Its maximum capacity is about 7 million barrels a day. The attack therefore had implications beyond the immediate loss of throughput: it hit one of the most important pieces of infrastructure the kingdom had built as an alternative to the Hormuz route.
Qatar: a blow to the gas economy
In Qatar, the shock centred more directly on liquefied natural gas, the backbone of the economy and the basis of its role in the global energy market. The attack on the Ras Laffan complex, with damage to two gas production trains and a gas-to-liquids facility, put about 17 per cent of Qatar’s LNG capacity out of service.
Before the war, Qatar’s gas liquefaction capacity stood at about 77 million tonnes a year, with plans to increase it to about 126 million tonnes by 2027. Damage to some units has created new challenges for those plans. Some estimates indicate that repairs at certain facilities could take about three years; others suggest they could take as long as five.
Gas accounts for the bulk of Qatar’s revenues. A prolonged disruption to part of its production capacity therefore puts pressure not only on exports, but also on public revenues and spending and investment plans.
The UAE: war reaches the “alternative geography”
The UAE offers one of the clearest examples of the Gulf’s geographical vulnerability. Over the years, Abu Dhabi built a system centred on the Port of Fujairah and the oil pipelines feeding it to reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. The aim was to enable it to export a significant share of its production directly to the Gulf of Oman. But the war reached this alternative route too. An attack on the Port of Fujairah led to a partial suspension of oil-loading operations, coinciding with a halt in operations at the Shah gas field, an important source of supply for the domestic gas network.
With exports through Hormuz disrupted and Fujairah damaged, ADNOC was forced to shut down production on a large scale. Emirati crude output fell by more than 50 per cent at the peak of the crisis. The Port of Fujairah normally exported more than 1 million barrels a day of Murban crude.
The UAE’s losses extended beyond energy to aviation, trade, tourism and property. Occupancy rates at some Dubai hotels fell from more than 80 per cent before the war to between 20 and 25 per cent at the height of the turmoil. This reflected how quickly the shock spread from energy to the non-oil sectors on which the UAE’s economic diversification strategy depends.
Kuwait: exports and refining under pressure
Kuwait faced pressure on two fronts: some export traffic through the Strait of Hormuz was disrupted, while refining facilities came under attack. Several major refineries, particularly Mina Al Ahmadi and Mina Abdullah, operated at reduced capacity. Difficulties moving products also put pressure on storage capacity.
Kuwait declared force majeure in some activities as the war affected production and economic activity and caused human losses. The Kuwaiti economy’s heavy dependence on oil exports and their revenues means that any prolonged disruption to ports or refineries has direct consequences for public finances.
Bahrain: a small economy exposed to energy disruption
In Bahrain, attacks reached Sitra Island, home to Bapco’s main refinery. Explosions and incidents in some areas associated with oil infrastructure also caused civilian injuries and operational damage. In a relatively small economy, disruption to refining or exports has a proportionately greater impact, particularly when several industrial, financial and service activities are connected to the regional energy system.
Bahrain’s losses therefore extended beyond the damaged facilities to surrounding economic activity and supply chains linked to the sector.
Across the Gulf, losses were not confined to oil and gas. The World Bank cut its 2026 growth forecast for Gulf Cooperation Council economies by about 3.1 percentage points to around 1.3 per cent, compared with growth of about 4.4 per cent in 2025. Estimates became more pessimistic as the war continued and its effects widened. In June 2026, the World Bank expected growth in the Gulf economies most exposed to the conflict to fall from about 3.9 per cent in 2025 to close to zero by the end of 2026. Other estimates reported by Reuters placed Qatar and Kuwait among the economies most at risk of contraction, with declines potentially exceeding 8 per cent in some scenarios if energy exports and economic activity remain disrupted.
These developments show that vast reserves alone are no longer enough to guarantee economic security. A state may have the capacity to produce millions of barrels, but the economic value of those resources still depends on a functioning refinery, a secure pipeline, a port able to load cargo, an open sea lane and an accessible market.
Overcoming geographical weaknesses
These indicators suggest that Gulf states are more aware than ever of their geographical vulnerabilities and the strategic constraints these impose, which could affect the future of the entire region. The search for an “alternative geography”, or an expansion of strategic reach beyond national borders, is no longer merely an additional option. It has become a national security necessity: a means of reducing geographical exposure, diversifying transport and supply routes, and creating more room for manoeuvre in potential crises.
Saudi Arabia has sought to address several geographical and strategic challenges, particularly water scarcity, the need to secure resources and supply chains, and the vulnerability of oil and energy transport routes. A significant proportion of these routes depends on maritime corridors, especially the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, whose disruption could put pressure on trade and energy flows. Riyadh has therefore moved to expand its agricultural and food investments around the world, alongside participation in port projects, transport links, refineries and exploration, giving it greater diversity and strategic flexibility.
The UAE has followed a similar path, driven by its awareness of its limited non-oil resources, heavy dependence on trade and imports, and the importance of traditional maritime corridors to its economy. It has worked to build a broad network of ports, logistics projects and investments in energy, minerals and agriculture across Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas. Extending its economic reach abroad is part of a broader strategy to strengthen its economic and logistical security.
Qatar faces a challenge arising from the concentration of a central part of its gas production and exports in the Gulf, leaving export routes highly vulnerable during crises and regional tensions. Doha has consequently moved to expand its energy investments outside the region and enter into a range of investment and logistics partnerships and projects in Asia and Africa. These help diversify its interests and reduce its dependence on a single geographical area.
For Kuwait, heavy reliance on oil and its revenues remains both a major strength and a source of vulnerability. Its economy is closely tied to the security of oil facilities and uninterrupted exports. Investments in refineries and other oil projects abroad, including in Vietnam, have sought to extend Kuwait’s oil system beyond its borders and spread some of its risks outside the country.
Oman, by contrast, has sought to use its Indian Ocean location as a geopolitical advantage. It has focused on developing ports, transport networks and logistics services, while seeking to strengthen Muscat’s position as a commercial and logistics hub able to benefit from maritime trade routes outside the Gulf. This gives the sultanate greater flexibility in dealing with limited resources and some of the economic pressures associated with its geography.
Bahrain appears to be following a similar course. Limited resources and the narrow scope of its economy leave it more vulnerable to regional and external shocks. It has therefore sought to expand its financial, industrial and investment activities abroad and across several regional markets, in an attempt to develop additional sources of economic activity and cushion the domestic economy against disruption.
Taken together, these initiatives can be seen as an attempt to redefine the relationship between the state and geography. Geography is no longer simply a fixed constraint within which a state must operate: its reach can be extended through economic activity, logistics and investment. Building overseas networks of ports, energy, food and investment is, at its core, an effort to address “geographic fragility” through a broader network of alternatives and interests. The aim is to reduce dependence on a single transit point, a single resource or a limited geographical area.
International experience
Gulf states are not alone in pursuing “alternative geography”. Many countries have adopted this approach to protect their economies from domestic vulnerabilities by locating some of the assets and activities that underpin their economic, food and logistical security abroad. The central idea is that, although a state cannot change its location, it can extend its influence beyond that location and build overseas networks that ease its geographical constraints.
China is one of the most significant examples. Faced with population pressures, limited arable land and heavy reliance on imports for several goods and resources, Beijing began building what can be described as an extensive alternative geography. It invested in land and agricultural projects abroad, particularly in Africa, Southeast Asia, South America and Eastern Europe. These investments gave it a presence at multiple stages of the supply chain, from agricultural production through storage and transport to the delivery of goods to the Chinese market.
This strategy extended beyond food security to ports, trade corridors and transport networks, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative. China has sought to build a broad network of ports and logistics projects around the world, improving its ability to diversify trade and energy routes, reduce dependence on a limited number of maritime corridors, and move closer to global markets and production centres.
Japan offers a different model, based largely on “buying food security” abroad. Limited agricultural land and heavy dependence on imports gradually pushed Tokyo away from pursuing full, costly agricultural self-sufficiency. Instead, it invested in global food companies, acquired stakes in agricultural companies and projects, and built long-term partnerships with Australia and producing countries in North and South America. The principle is straightforward: if a country cannot produce everything it needs within its borders, it can instead own part of the supply chain that produces those goods and controls their flow.
Other countries, including Türkiye, the Netherlands and Indonesia, have also pursued versions of this approach. Their methods have differed according to their circumstances, vulnerabilities and economic needs, but they share one idea: making overseas assets and activities function as an extension of the domestic economy, and using investment, trade, ports, supply chains and international partnerships to ease national geographical constraints.
From this perspective, “alternative geography” appears to be more than conventional foreign investment. It can be understood as a means of reshaping a state’s economic and strategic power. States that cannot change their location or natural resources instead seek to change the effects of that location by building networks of interests, assets and routes abroad. Their national territory becomes part of a wider area in which they can operate, rather than the ultimate limit on their choices.
Under this approach, “alternative geography” is less a project to leave the Gulf or move beyond its borders than an attempt to extend its economic and logistical reach beyond its immediate political boundaries. It involves building overseas networks capable of easing the structural vulnerabilities imposed by natural geography and exposed by successive crises.
A port operated or invested in by a Gulf state in Africa, a farm in Europe, a gas facility in Texas and a refinery in Asia do not become part of its national territory. In practice, however, they become part of its network of vital interests and economic security. They provide complementary links in its ability to secure food, energy, trade and supply chains, both in stable periods and during crises.
“Alternative geography” thus goes beyond foreign investment in its conventional sense. It comes closer to reshaping a state’s strategic reach by distributing interests, assets and routes across several geographical areas, reducing dependence on a single area, corridor or source. Yet the central question remains, and can serve as the concluding question for this series: how far can alternative geography compensate for the vulnerabilities of natural geography? Can it spread risks and reduce exposure, or might it transfer some of the same weaknesses abroad in a new and more complex form?